Professor in the Department of Economics
Professor Yildirim's recent research concerns charitable giving, sequencing of bilateral negotiations, and the value of (non-)blind review. His papers have appeared in top economics journals such as American Economic Review, Review of Economic Studies, Journal of Economic Theory, and RAND journal of Economics.
Paskalev, Z, and Yildirim, H. "A theory of outsourced fundraising: Why dollars turn into “Pennies for Charity” (Accepted)." Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 137 (May 2017): 1-18. Full Text Open Access Copy
Krasteva, S, and Yildirim, H. "Information, competition, and the quality of charities." Journal of Public Economics 144 (December 2016): 64-77. Full Text
Name Correa, A, and Yildirim, H. "A Capture Theory of Committees." Economic Research Initiatives at Duke (ERID) Working Paper, no. 239 (November 24, 2016).
Yildirim, H. "Andreoni-Mcguire Algorithm and the Limits of Warm-Glow Giving." Journal of Public Economics 114 (January 1, 2014): 101-107. (Working Paper) Full Text Open Access Copy
Name-Correa, AJ, and Yildirim, H. "A Theory of Charitable Fund-Raising with Costly Solicitations." American Economic Review 103, no. 2 (April 2013): 1091-1107.
Krasteva, S, and Yildirim, H. "Payoff uncertainty, bargaining power, and the strategic sequencing of bilateral negotiations." RAND Journal of Economics 43, no. 3 (2012): 514-536. Full Text
Krasteva, S, and Yildirim, H. "On the role of confidentiality and deadlines in bilateral negotiations." Games and Economic Behavior 75, no. 2 (2012): 714-730. Full Text
Taylor, CR, and Yildirim, H. "Subjective performance and the value of blind evaluation." Review of Economic Studies 78, no. 2 (2011): 762-794. Full Text