Professor of Economics
Professor Yildirim's recent research concerns charitable giving, sequencing of bilateral negotiations, and the value of (non-)blind review. His papers have appeared in top economics journals such as American Economic Review, Review of Economic Studies, Journal of Economic Theory, and RAND journal of Economics.
Yildirim, H. "Distribution of surplus in sequential bargaining with endogenous recognition." Public Choice 142, no. 1-2 (2010): 41-57. Full Text
Yildirim, H. "Proposal power and majority rule in multilateral bargaining with costly recognition." Journal of Economic Theory 136, no. 1 (2007): 167-196. Full Text Open Access Copy
YILDIRIM, H. "Getting the Ball Rolling: Voluntary Contributions to a Large-Scale Public Project." Journal of Public Economic Theory 8, no. 4 (October 2006): 503-528.
Lewis, TR, and Yildirim, H. "Managing switching costs in multiperiod procurements with strategic buyers." International Economic Review 46, no. 4 (2005): 1233-1269. Full Text Open Access Copy
Romano, R, and Yildirim, H. "On the endogeneity of Cournot-Nash and Stackelberg equilibria: Games of accumulation." Journal of Economic Theory 120, no. 1 (2005): 73-107. Full Text Open Access Copy
Lewis, TR, and Yildirim, H. "Learning by doing and dynamic regulation." RAND Journal of Economics 33, no. 1 (2002): 22-36.